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Abstract.  This paper discusses how model checking, a technique used for the verification of
behavioural requirements of dynamic systems, can be usefully deployed for the verification of
contracts.  A process view of agreements between parties is taken, whereby a contract is
modelled as it evolves over time in terms of actions or more generally events that effect changes
in its state.  Modelling is done with Petri Nets in the spirit of other research work on the
representation of trade procedures.  The paper illustrates all the phases of the verification
technique through an example and argues that the approach is useful particularly in the context of
pre-contractual negotiation and contract drafting.  The work reported here is part of a broader
project on the development of logic-based tools for the analysis and representation of legal
contracts [4].
1.
 
Introduction
The set of norms which parties agree to abide by during their business exchange essentially
specifies the parties’ ideal mode of exchange.  Some researchers, such as Lee and his associates refer
to such norms as “trade procedures” (cf. [9, 1] or “business protocols” (cf. [13]) and they are similar,
in nature and function, to what software and hardware engineers call “specifications”.  Questions of
completeness and consistency of such sets of norms arise in the context of contractual negotiation
and drafting just as questions of verification arise in relation to specifications in software and
hardware engineering.  Whether a contract (or trade procedure, business protocol, specification)
covers all intended cases without conflicts and whether the ideal mode of exchange that it describes
has the appropriate safety (“nothing bad will happen”) and liveness (“something good will happen”)
properties is a concern both during pre-contractual exchanges and when drafters formulate detailed
provisions to record the result of such pre-contractual exchanges.  Ill-defined contracts may result in
undesirable situations when put into practice, with parties finding that they cannot execute them or
that unanticipated circumstances arise which cannot be resolved without resorting to costly and
lengthy litigation.  If a contract can be both formally specified and verified, that is, checked for
undesirable pathological features, then not only is its negotiation conducted more effectively but also
its subsequent performance is smoother.
A number of formal techniques have proved effective in finding pathological features in
specifications of hardware (and software) systems.  What follows presents the essential features of
such techniques and discusses how they can be applied in the case of contracts1.  The verification
techniques discussed here operate on Petri net representations.  Petri nets were chosen because there
was available software that implements these verification techniques; in principle though the
verification techniques can be extended to any state-based description.  In what follows we show how
Petri nets are constructed from initial state diagrams for a contractual scenario that we use as an
example.
                                                     
1A more general version of the discussion in this paper can be found in [16].
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2. An Overview of the Verification Technique
Initially, a system is described using a number of Petri nets [12] that model it from different
perspectives.  In the case of hardware design, one Petri net is constructed for each individual
component of the system or for each set of different requirements.  In the case of contracts, each Petri
net represents one of the parties’ view of the business exchange.  Representing contracts as Petri nets
is not novel and has in fact been attempted by Lee and his associates (cf. [1]).  In this approach the
separate nets are combined into one large Petri net using a composition algebra.  The final Petri net is
likely to be too large and complicated to have been reliably designed and safely input by hand.  The
composition and every other process mentioned in this section, is fully automated.  The only human
inputs to the system are descriptions of the initial Petri nets and some behavioural requirements.
More information on the use of this composition algebra in micro-electronic design can be found in
[15] and [14].
The composed Petri net is processed in order to construct a model of its possible states.
Behavioural requirements for the model are then expressed in a species of temporal logic and the
state model is queried.  This process is called model checking [7, 11].  Temporal logic enables the
expression of properties about all future times from initialisation.  Examples of the kinds of questions
that can be expressed are “Is there a possible future in which a given request will never be
answered?” or “Can the contract ever be in a position in which one party must perform two
conflicting actions?”.  Model checking systems applied to hardware design are reasonably efficient
and have reported some notable successes, including the discovery (in minutes) of bugs that eluded
months of NASA testing [8].  The verification models and processes involved in model checking are
explained in the sections that follow in terms of a contractual example.
2.1. Specification of a Sales Contract through State Diagrams
This section considers a contractual scenario in which a seller interacts with a purchaser2.  The
parties agree that delivery of goods will happen when and if the purchaser can take such delivery.
The parties’ contract stipulates that the business exchange will operate in two phases.  The first phase
concerns the transfer of goods from the seller to the purchaser.  The second phase concerns the
transfer of funds from the purchaser to the seller in payment of the goods that were exchanged.
The parties agree that the first phase of the transaction will operate as follows: The seller can
indicate that he has goods available for delivery (GAV).  The purchaser can indicate that he requests
goods (RFG) and that he has taken delivery of goods (GAC).  The required sequence of events for
the transfer of goods from the seller to the purchaser is as follows: GAV, RFG and GAC are initially
false (denoted as GAV_F, RFG_F, GAC_F), that is, the seller has no goods available for delivery,
the purchaser does not request any goods and has not accepted any goods.  When the purchaser
requests goods (RFG_T) the seller may assert that goods are available (GAV_T) and the request for
goods is discharged (RFG_F).  When the purchaser has taken the specified quantity of goods GAC
becomes true (GAC_T) and only then may the seller assert that there are no more goods available
(GAV_F).  Finally the purchaser may set GAC back to false and the cycle may repeat.
The second phase of the transaction, where funds are transferred between the purchaser and the
seller will operate as follows: The purchaser can indicate that he has funds ready for payment (FAV).
The seller can indicate that he requests funds (i.e. that he requests payment) (RFF) and that he has
received funds (FAC).  The reader may notice that the propositions indicating availability of funds,
request for funds and acceptance of funds are of the same form as those indicating availability of
goods, request for goods and acceptance of goods.  Indeed the sequence of events for the second
phase of the transaction is of the same form as the sequence of events for the first phase of the
transaction.  What follows concentrates therefore on the first phase of the transaction but is
applicable to the second phase as well.
The state diagram in Figure 1 illustrates the seller’s view of the first phase of the transaction.
The seller is initially in state S0 (which corresponds to his being not ready for the transaction, for
example because he has no goods available).  When the seller is ready (in state S1), if he receives a
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 This is a variation of the multi-party trading procedure described in [16], where a single seller interacts with multiple purchasers.
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request for goods from the purchaser he moves to a state where he starts the sale (S2).  When the
goods have been delivered to the purchaser (that is, from the point of view of the purchaser when he
has accepted them, GAC_T) the seller is in state S3, where the sale has finished and he may end the
first phase of the transaction.
The state diagram in Figure 2 illustrates the purchaser’s view of the first phase of the
transaction.  The purchaser is initially in state P0 (not ready for the transaction, for example because
he does not require any goods).  When the purchaser is ready and requests goods (state P1) if goods
are available (GAV_T) he moves to a state where he starts the purchase (P2).  When the goods have
been delivered the purchaser is in state P3 where he has finished his purchase and accepted the goods.
The initial specification of our example contract was given in terms of state diagrams3.  The
verification techniques discussed in this section operate on specifications given as Petri nets, which
are generalisations of state machines.
S1
S2S3
S0
GAV_F GAV_F
GAV_TGAV_T
GAC_T
RFG_T
Seller_ready_T
Seller_ready_F
Figure 1 The seller’s view of the contract
P1
P2P3
P0
RFG_F
GAC_F
GAV_T
Purchaser_ready_T
RFG_T
GAC_F
RFG_T
GAC_F
RFG_F
GAC_T
GAV_F
Purchaser_ready_F
Figure 2 The purchaser’s view of the contract
                                                     
3
 See [5] for more details on representing contracts using state diagrams.
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2.2. Petri Nets and their Composition
A Petri net is essentially a bi-partite directed graph, which comprises two sets of nodes: a set
of places P (represented as circles) and a set of transitions T (represented as bars).  Arcs connect
places to transitions or transitions to places (but not transitions to transitions or places to places).  The
dynamic behaviour of the system being modelled is represented by tokens (shown as dots) flowing
through the net.  Each transition in a Petri net has certain requirements (preconditions) and effects
(postconditions).  At any given time, each place of a net may or may not have a token in it.  Places
containing tokens are said to be marked.  A marking of a Petri net is a snapshot of the net that
indicates what commodities are available at any given time.  A transition is said to be fireable in a
given marking if all of its preconditions are marked.  When such a transition fires, its preconditions
are unmarked and its postconditions become marked.  Dynamic behaviour in a Petri net is obtained
as a sequence of markings, each derived by firing one or all of the fireable transitions from the
previous marking.
Petri nets are usually given pictorially as in Figure 3, where the single transition has
preconditions p1 and p2 and postconditions p1 and p3.  The transition is fireable when p1 and p2
become true (in their respective places) and as a result it renders p1 and p3 true.
p2
p3
p1
Figure 3 Example Petri Net with three places and one transition
There are various flavours of Petri nets, allowing for example transitions to have outputs [6].
Lee and his associates [1] have introduced another variant, called Documentary Petri Nets, for
modelling trade procedures.  In Documentary Petri Nets some of the places are distinguished (and
represented as squares rather than circles) to denote documents—Bons et al. find this a useful
distinction for their method of composing different views of the same transaction.
In the context of the techniques discussed here Petri nets are composed quite differently, so we
restrict the discussion to simple Petri nets.  However, it should be noted that all the mathematical
results and software alluded to here have variants for several different flavours of Petri nets.
Moreover, since Petri nets are a generalisation of finite state machines, the techniques described here
are directly applicable to any modelling technique based on finite state machines.
Composition of Petri nets is conducted through labelling them by naming some of the
transitions with elements from a labelling set L.  The labels provide synchronisation information
(those transitions in the individual nets without labels are not available for synchronisation).  The
composed Petri net may contain unlabelled transitions, which cannot be synchronised with any
transitions in other component nets.  The synchronisation information used in the composition is
given by partial functions from an event set E to the various labelling sets.  A transition t from one
Petri net synchronises with a transition t’ from another, if the labels of the two transitions are both
mapped to by the same event in the event set E.  The seller’s state diagram that we saw in Figure 1
translates to the Petri net illustrated in Figure 4.  The purchaser’s state diagram that we saw in Figure
2 corresponds to the Petri net shown in Figure 5.
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SellerGAV_F
Seller_ready_T
S0 S1
S3 S2
SellerGAV_F
Seller_ready_F SellerRFG_T
SellerGAV_T
SellerGAC_T
SellerGAV_T
Figure 4 The seller’s Petri net of the transaction
PurchaserRFG_T
Purchaser_ready_T
P0 P1
P3 P2
PurchaserGAV_T
Purchaser_ready_F
PurchaserGAC_T
PurchaserGAV_F
Figure 5 The purchaser’s Petri Net of the transaction
The self-loops on some of the places are necessary in synchronisation.  The specification of the
transaction is completed by adding the synchronisation information, that is, by providing an event set
and the information about how each event is viewed in each net.
In this case the event set is:
  
FGAVPTGAVPGACRFGE __,__,,
The events are “request for goods”, “goods accepted” and goods becoming available
(P_GAV_T) or unavailable (P_GAV_F) to the purchaser.  The information about each of the parties’
view of these events is given by the following partial functions, which map events (shown on the left
of the 

symbol) to transitions in each of the Petri nets that model each party’s view of the
transaction:
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Seller:
FSellerGAVFGAVP
TSellerGAVTGAVP
TSellerGACGAC
TSellerRFGRFG
___
___
_
_




Purchaser:
FAVPurchaserGFGAVP
TAVPurchaserGTGAVP
TACPurchaserGGAC
TFGPurchaserRRFG
___
___
_
_




The composed Petri net with one purchaser and one seller is illustrated in Figure 8.  The
composition allows us to combine more than two component Petri nets (say, in the case of multi-
party transactions) but this example is intended to illustrate how difficult it would be to describe
directly the resulting Petri net for more components.
In a composed Petri net there are two kinds of transitions: some are transitions from the
component Petri nets, for which there is no synchronisation information.  Such transitions are merely
carried over from the component nets to the composed net.  The other transitions are the result of
synchronising one transition from each component Petri net, in accordance to the event set.  Consider
for instance the two component Petri nets in Figure 6 and suppose that the synchronisation
information available is that an event x synchronises transitions a1 and b1, while there is no
synchronisation information for transition b2.  That is, the event set is }{xE   and we have the
following partial functions defined for each component Petri net:
A: 1ax 
B: 1bx

A1
A2
a1
B1
B2 B3
B4
b1
b2
Figure 6 Example Component Petri Nets (A and B)
In their composition, which is shown in Figure 7, the transition marked (a1, b1) corresponds to
the two synchronised transitions of the corresponding component Petri nets, while the transition b2 is
carried over from Petri net B.  A composed transition such as (a1, b1) has as input and output places
all the input and output places of its component transitions, as can be inferred from the example in
Figure 7.
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A1
A2
B1
B2 B3
B4
(a1, b1)
b2
Figure 7 The Composition of Petri Nets A and B
More details on the composition of Petri nets can be found in [14, 15].
2.3. State Models
State models (from a systems modelling perspective) are directed graphs or finite state
machines without the inputs, that show the possible state changes of a system.  State models are
generated as the markings of Petri nets.  In our example, the initial marking has S0 and P0 marked in
the individual Petri nets of seller and purchaser.  This leads to the state model shown in Figure 9.
If we had a multi-party scenario, the state model would not have been deterministic.  The next
stage of verification is to test the truth of various conditions of the state model.  The logics used in
model checking are all species of propositional temporal logic.  The most frequently used is called
Computation Tree Logic (or CTL) [3].
S1
S2
S0
S3
P1P0
P2P3
Figure 8 Composed Petri Net of seller and purchaser
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S0
P0
S1
P0
S1
P1
S2
P1
S2
P2
S2
P3
S3
P3
S0
P3
Figure 9 State model of composed Petri net
2.4. Computation Tree Logic
Well-formed formulae in CTL are atomic propositional ones or compounds formed by using
logical connectives and some temporal operators.  Semantic relations are defined between states and
formulae.  Expressions of the form s   , where s  is a state and   is a formula, mean that   is
true in state s .  The definition of 	  is shown in Table 1:
Table 1 Semantics in CTL
s  

 
 Iff s  does not satisfy 

.
s     Iff s  satisfies at least one of   and 
s     Iff s  satisfies both of  and 
s     Iff s  

 
ff fi
fl(
ffi

.
s   ! "
#E Iff in some immediate successor state of s , 
# holds.  That is, it is
possible for # to hold in the next state
s  $ %
"
#A Iff in all immediate successor states of s , 
# holds.  That is, it is
necessary that #  will hold in the next state.
s  $ %
"
#F Iff in some future state reachable from s , 
# holds.  That is, #  holds
eventually.
s  $ % "
#G Iff in all future states reachable from s , 
#
 holds.  That is, #  holds
(globally) for ever after s .
s  $ % "
&Au' On all paths from s , '  holds at all states until the first state in which &
holds ( &  is not assumed to ever hold).
s  ( ) *&Eu' On some maximal path from s , 
'
 holds at all states until the first state
in which & holds ( &  is not assumed to ever hold).  A maximal path is
either a path that comes to a dead-end or an infinite path.
s  ( ) *
&EU' On some path from s , '  holds at all states until the first state in which
& holds ( &  is assumed to eventually hold).
s  ( ) *
&AU' On all paths from s , '  holds at all states until the first state in which &
holds ( &  must eventually hold on every maximal path).
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The difference between u  and U  is subtle.  Consider the state model of Figure 10, where
letters outside states are the names of the states and letters inside the states represent properties that
are true in the states.
p q
r
A B
C
Figure 10 Example state model
There are infinitely many maximal paths from A: there is a length-one path to C; there are
paths from A to B staying in B for a number of cycles and then moving to C; and there is an infinite
path that goes to B and stays there by repeatedly going round the loop.  On all of those paths, q
remains true until r is true.  That is:
A + , -rAuq
On the infinite path r is never true, therefore:
A 
+ , -
r AUq.
There are some paths in which r is eventually true:
A 
+ , -
rEUq
The distinction between u  and U  does not show up in our example.  However, when more
than two parties are admitted (say one more purchaser) the distinction does show up: a purchaser
making a request for goods will persist until he is satisfied.  However, with two purchasers, if the
contract stipulates that the sale starts when all purchasers are ready to take goods, and the second
purchaser never requests goods, then the first purchaser’s request will never be satisfied.
2.5. Verification
One condition, a form of liveness that we might wish to check, is that from every state the
transaction can eventually return to its initial state.  In other words, we wish to establish that the
transaction between seller and purchaser will eventually terminate (that the contract between them
will at some point be discharged).  The condition is expressed below, where B is the initial state:
B + / 0
1
000 APSEFG 2
Some safety conditions we have also checked for the example presented here are:
3
 The seller should assert GAV_T only when the purchaser is ready (in state P1).  In other words,
we wish to establish whether there is a situation in which the seller has goods available for
delivery but the transaction cannot be realised because the purchaser is not ready to accept
delivery:
B 4 5 65 61P_TESellerGAVTSellerGAV_G 7
8
9
:
 Once GAV is true, it should remain true until the purchaser has accepted goods (that is, the
purchaser is in state P3).  In other words, we want to establish whether it is possible for the seller
to retract goods, once the transaction has started, before they have been accepted by the
purchaser:
B 
; < =< =3TAUPSellerGAV_TSellerGAV_G >
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?
 The purchaser should not accept goods until GAV is true, that is, the purchaser should not enter
P2 until GAV_T.  In other words, we want to establish that there is no situation in which the
purchaser’s obligation to pay for goods is active before such goods are available and delivered to
him:
B @ A BA BTSellerGAV_EPPG 33
C
D
E
These liveness and safety conditions were checked and all hold for the contract defined in our
example.
Checking simple conditions (that involve a state and its immediate successor) is
straightforward and computable; the algorithm involves looking ahead at most one step [14].  For
each of the more complicated temporal constructs, the model checking algorithm uses iterative
search.  The method is computable because it can be proven that these iterative techniques all finish
after a number of steps bounded by the length of the longest non-looping path in the state space.  The
model checking algorithm keeps performing iterations until the same result is reached twice (fixed
point).  It can be proven that a fixed point can be reached in bounded time.  However, the bound on
time is the number of states of the graph, which is at worst exponential on the number of variables.
This is called the state explosion problem.  The example used in this section is relatively small and
the number of states was manageable.  In the general case, the state model is transformed into
another model called a binary decision diagram (BDD).  The BDD is still exponential in the number
of variables but it admits reduction techniques to yield a reduced ordered binary decision diagram
(ROBDD), which is usually considerably smaller than the original state space4.  The ROBDD is then
queried using a species of temporal logic5.  More details on the transformation of state spaces into
ROBDDs can be found in [11] and a shorter discussion is in [16].
3. Discussion
Model checking has proved to be a powerful technique for verifying high-level behaviour of
hardware systems.  The example that was discussed in this paper showed how the technique can be
applied in a contractual setting to check a business transaction (that comes about after two parties
have entered a contract) against some temporal conditions.  As we saw, existing model checkers
operate on two specifications: one, which is the operational specification of system behaviour
expressed as Petri nets and the other, which is a declarative specification of behavioural requirements
expressed in temporal logic.  In a contractual setting, the system being modelled is the agreement.
The specification of its behaviour emerges by taking an operational view of the agreement, expressed
using Petri nets, as illustrated by the example.  Behavioural requirements are requirements about the
operational view of the agreement and these can be expressed in temporal logic.  By representing
agreements in this way, existing formal methods for the verification of hardware and software
systems are directly applicable to the verification of business transactions.
For the example discussed in this section bespoke software [14] was used to construct the
composed Petri net and to check it.  This choice was primarily made because these tools were readily
available.  Any standard CTL-based model checker would be suitable, such as CheckOff, which is
currently marketed by Siemens6.  The techniques described here were also tried on examples of trade
procedures discussed in Lee [10].  Of those, the one that appears to be the most complex concerns a
sales contract between a Buyer and a Seller, where a Bank provides a letter of credit and a Carrier is
subcontracted to deliver the goods.  The abstract view of the transactions between the four parties of
the trade procedure is illustrated in Figure 11:
                                                     
4 The reduction techniques have been used to reason effectively with systems with more than 1020 states. [2].
5 In our example we used CTL but other model checkers operate on different temporal logics such as interval temporal logic or
linear temporal logic.
6 In fact CheckOff has been tried on larger specifications for hardware and was faster than the model checker developed by
Zimmer & McDonald [14].
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71 8
9
4
5
6
3
2
Seller Buyer
Carrier
Bank
Figure 11 Sales Contract with Carrier Sub-Contracting and Letter of Credit
The various transactions that take place between the parties involved in the trade procedure are
as follows:
1. Seller makes goods available to Carrier for dispatch.  Carrier provides Seller
with certificate that goods have been dispatched.
2. Seller supplies Bank with certificate that goods have been dispatched and
certificate that the Buyer owns the goods.
3. Bank pays Seller the required price for goods.
4. Carrier notifies Buyer that goods have arrived.
5. Buyer instructs Bank to pay the required price and interest.
6. Bank sends to Buyer certificate that he owns the goods.
7. Buyer presents Carrier with certificate that he owns the goods, Carrier gives
the goods to Buyer, and Buyer gives Carrier receipt.
8. Carrier provides Seller with receipt issued by Buyer.
9. Seller pays Carrier the agreed price for delivery.
The similarity between this seemingly complex example and the simple scenario that we used
in this paper should be obvious.  In the simple case, we considered only the part of a trade procedure
that is relevant to the transfer of goods.  In Lee’s example, there are goods, funds and various
certificates that are exchanged between parties.  A Petri net can be constructed showing each of the
four participants’ views of the aspects of the transaction that are relevant to him and these can be
composed and checked against behavioural requirements (Lee [10] lists some such requirements, for
instance that transition 2 in the list above must happen before transition 3).
The techniques discussed here were also applied to a few trade procedures that were extracted
from sample contracts that concerned the supply of natural gas from hydrocarbon field owners.  Our
experimentation suggested that the larger the trade procedure that is modelled, the more individual
Petri nets need to be formulated so that they can be subsequently composed using the Petri net
composition tool.  The difficulty in this process lies in establishing the procedure, aspects of which
may be described in different parts of a large contractual document, rather than modelling and model
checking it.  It is also difficult sometimes to establish the precise behavioural requirements that we
would want the procedure to satisfy.
We found that the operationalisation of the transaction and its representation as Petri nets
conceals the distinction between ideal and actual behaviour.  Obligatory, permissible or prohibited
actions that parties may perform during the transaction are interpreted and incorporated in the model
implicitly, rather than explicitly.
Such interpretation might be incorrect or incomplete (for example a safety or liveness
condition might be omitted or misinterpreted).  The verification process establishes whether a given
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operational specification is correct against a declarative one.  It does not however address whether
each of the two specifications is correct or complete.
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